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1 Don’t Go Protectionist! 
Trade and Investment Relations 
between the EU and China
The European Parliament has proposed the creation of a body to 
monitor foreign – in particular Chinese – investment in the EU. The 
initiative, driven by fears of unfair competition and a hidden political 
agenda behind Chinese investments, should be rejected. There are 
better ways to promote openness and transparency in Sino-European 
economic relations.
Asia Briefings June 2012
Cora F. Jungbluth, Helmut Hauschild*
Rising investment flows by Chinese 
companies within the European Union have 
fueled debate over whether these ventures 
might have ties to the Chinese government – 
and thus a partially strategic aim – raising the 
question of whether tighter control of Chinese 
investment activities might be necessary. 
The European stance on these issues is 
unequivocal: China is accused of creating 
unfair competition by providing preferential 
policies to its domestic firms. These are 
therefore able to undercut Western incumbents 
by engaging in so-called dumping, or pricing 
goods unrealistically low, in violation of WTO 
rules. Moreover, Western companies in China 
have to face serious infringements of their 
copyrights and are discriminated against in 
public procurement processes, while Chinese 
companies in the European Union can compete 
on equal footing with European incumbents. 
Thus in May 2012, the European Parliament 
(EP) adopted a resolution proposing the 
creation of a body tasked with monitoring 
foreign investment, with particular emphasis 
on investment from China.
This, then, is the European perspective. 
Much less has been written providing the 
Chinese point of view. In China, it is widely 
held that Western nations tend to apply 
different standards to the international trade 
and investment regime largely created by 
themselves. Moreover, Chinese policymakers 
see Western leaders as failing to sufficiently 
acknowledge the differences in the development 
stage of their trading partners and focusing too 
heavily on political issues, thereby sometimes 
neglecting important economic factors. With 
these conflicting accounts each gaining 
currency in their respective regions, it appears 
time to take a step back and try to see both sides 
of the EU-China trade and investment picture.
China has surged powerfully back to the 
world stage since instigating its policy of 
reform and opening (gaige kaifang) in the late 
1970s, certainly from an economic perspective, 
but recently politically as well. Trade and 
investment relations between the EU and 
China have intensified to an unprecedented 
degree over the last three decades. To outside 
observers, China’s vast geographical size, huge 
population and annual growth rates averaging 
near 9 percent give it the appearance of a 
giant. It is thus unsurprising that the country’s 
rise has nurtured fear and insecurity within 
the EU. Indeed, it is a widespread perception 
among European politicians and media 
commentators that the “dragon’s insatiable 
hunger” endangers Western dominance and 
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the global supply of energy and resources. 
China’s so-called state capitalism subjects 
companies from Western market economies 
to unfair competition, not only in China itself, 
but also on international markets. The Chinese 
model seems gradually to be evolving into an 
alternative development path that eschews 
Western values such as democracy and human 
rights – societal features long believed to be 
foundational elements in a superior road 
to growth and happiness. To some Western 
observers, a “war of systems” seems likely.
However, it must be noted that as of today, 
the evolution of trade and investment between 
the two regions shows a strong bias toward 
creating a win-win situation. Growth rates for 
Sino-EU trade and investment flows, especially 
since China’s WTO access in 2001, have 
been impressive. This intensifying economic 
relationship has contributed substantially to the 
enhancement of welfare gains in both China 
and the EU. To maintain the win-win situation in 
Sino-European economic exchanges, both sides 
must adhere to a general and mutually accepted 
system of rules as provided by the WTO for 
trade relations. This paper thus offers some 
suggestions on how to increase transparency 
and openness in investment as well. 
I. EU-China trade and 
investment – a brief 
overview
Following its Eastern extension, the 
European Union replaced the United States as 
China’s biggest trading partner in 2004. For its 
part, China is currently the European Union’s 
second-largest trading partner. Exports from 
China have been rising far more quickly than 
imports to China, a fact which has triggered 
huge deficits (N156 billion in 2011) and laid 
the foundation for continuous trade disputes. 
Relations between the EU and China (1975-2012)
Important milestones
1975 Establishment of official diplomatic relations
1985 EC-China Trade and Cooperation Agreement
1989
Imposition of sanctions on China in response to the violent intervention on Tian’anmen Square 
(arms embargo ongoing)
1992 Deng Xiaoping’s “Journey to the South” pushes mutual economic relations
1995
Establishment of EU-China human rights dialogue 
EU publishes first Communication on China-Europe relations
1996 First Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)
1998 First EU-China Summit
2000 EU and China reach agreement on WTO access
2001 China enters the WTO after 15 years of negotiations
2003
China’s first strategic paper on EU policy 
Launch of EU-China comprehensive strategic partnership
2004 EU replaces U.S. as China’s largest trading partner
2005
Trade dispute regarding Chinese textile and clothing exports (“bra war”) 
EU-China partnership for climate change
2007 Begin of negotiations on a EU-China partnership and cooperation agreement
2008 Establishment of EU-China strategic economic dialogue
2012 EU-China year of intercultural dialogue
Source: Own research.
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The financial crisis strongly impacted 
bilateral trade, serving to ease the previous 
imbalances slightly: Whereas imports from 
China sharply dropped in 2009, exports to 
China experienced unprecedented growth. EU 
export-oriented nations such as Germany have 
benefited from this development, and were 
able to stabilize their crisis-ridden economies 
more quickly than other member states. 
Whereas bilateral trade shows a 
pronounced bias toward exports from China, 
the reverse is true of FDI outflows from 
China. Chinese FDI to the European Union 
amounted to only 1.7 percent (N0.9 billion) of 
total inflows in 2010, whereas European FDI 
to China accounted for as much as 20 percent 
(N7.1 billion) of total outflows. Reciprocal FDI 
flows are thus strongly biased toward FDI from 
the EU to China. 
Historically speaking, China’s low levels 
of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) 
were due to a dearth of foreign exchange 
and the fear of an unrestrained outflow of 
capital. From the 1980s onward, the Chinese 
government successfully sought to attract 
foreign capital (yinjinlai), while at the 
same time restricting outflows (zouchuqu). 
According to the U.N. Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), China’s inward 
foreign direct investment (IFDI) volume 
($105.7 billion) ranked third worldwide after 
the European Union ($304.7 billion) and the 
United States ($228.2 billion) in 2010. Since a 
large proportion of the IFDI attracted by China 
to date has been export-oriented, Western 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) effectively 
contributed to creating the current trade 
deficit. Indeed, according to China’s Ministry 
of Commerce (MOFCOM), about 52 percent of 
China’s 2011 exports originated from foreign-
funded or foreign-owned firms.
OFDI from China did not play an important 
role in China’s reform policy until after the 
introduction of the so-called Going Global 
Strategy (GGS, zouchuqu zhanlüe) in 2000. 
Since that time, China has engaged in a 
EU-China bilateral trade (mn euro)
1999
“Going Global“
Strategy
WTO Access
Imports
from China
Exports
to China
EU+10
Extension
EU+2
Extension
Financial
Crisis
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
50000
0
100 000
150 000
200 000
250 000
300 000
350 000
Source: Eurostat. 
A
sia
 P
ol
ic
y 
Br
ie
f 
20
12
/0
1
04
catching-up process with respect to OFDI. 
From the government’s perspective, this will 
ultimately increase China’s international 
competitiveness, reduce export dependency 
and strengthen domestic demand. 
II. Tensions and benefits – 
both sides of the story
China’s huge trade surplus with the 
EU-27 constitutes one of the core issues 
in EU-China relations. From the European 
perspective, this deficit has not been the 
result of fair and free trade, but is due to 
distorted competition induced by strong state 
involvement within the Chinese export sector. 
The Chinese government has traditionally 
favored an export-oriented development model 
and has set policy incentives accordingly: 
Chinese companies are granted cheap credits, 
subsidies and tax relief, which enables them 
to sell products at artificially low prices on 
international markets. Western critics assert 
that this amounts to “dumping.” 
In the investment arena, continuous 
tensions have been associated with 
discrimination against European companies in 
China as well as the widespread prevalence of 
counterfeiting. Special regulations governing 
foreign investment, for example, may induce 
involuntary technology transfer. Investors are 
often required to disclose their blueprints and 
other sensitive information. In many cases, 
Chinese incumbents have been able to access 
this information and use it to establish their 
own competitive advantage. EU firms also face 
discrimination within the public procurement 
market, which is extremely difficult for foreign 
firms to access. Counterfeiting remains a 
general and persistent worry, making many 
companies hesitant to deploy their latest 
technology in China. Addressing these issues, 
Marielle de Sarnez, a member of the European 
Parliament and author of the resolution cited 
EU-China trade deficit (mn euro)
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above, said: “We have to protect EU businesses 
from problems such as trade barriers, 
counterfeiting and monetary dumping.” 
Chinese OFDI to the European Union, even at 
its current low volumes, has recently created 
new tensions, as European countries feel 
there is a lack of transparency regarding the 
ownership and motives of Chinese companies.
From the Chinese point of view, Western 
partners seem to have double standards 
when it comes to trade and investment, with 
much depending on whether the investor’s 
underlying political system is a democracy or 
not. In anti-dumping cases, economic factors 
such as market clearing prices and cyclical 
price declines appear to be overlooked. 
Moreover, some trading partners of the 
European Union and the United States appear 
to be more equal than others, even though 
WTO rules – by and large a Western construct 
– generally prohibit discrimination. Of course, 
China has not yet been recognized as a market 
economy by the European Union and the United 
States, and thus may be treated differently 
even under the WTO regime. China has always 
regarded this situation as a major flaw in 
mutual relations, and the Chinese government 
holds that the country today fulfils the 
necessary requirements for equal treatment. 
Similarly, the level of state involvement in the 
Chinese economy is regarded as having been 
exaggerated by foreign observers. By investing 
in the European Union, Chinese companies 
are increasingly seeking access today to state-
of-the-art technology, strategic resources and 
new markets. In doing so, they face a variety 
of difficulties such as non-tariff trade barriers, 
overly biased media reporting and actual 
prejudice against their products and firms. 
For China, it is hard to understand how the 
European Union can constantly encourage – 
and even demand – Chinese investment in 
support of Europe’s economy during the euro 
crisis, while China is at the same time suspected 
of perpetrating political infiltration by means of 
government-backed corporations. 
Clearly, tensions between the European 
Union and China are manifold and will not 
be easily resolved in the near future. It is 
therefore essential to bear in mind the benefits 
both sides have received as a result of bilateral 
trade and investment flows. 
European countries have been able to 
enhance their overall economic structure. They 
have outsourced labor-intensive portions of 
industries showing profit declines (e.g., apparel 
and textile production) to China, and have 
themselves moved toward high-end production 
and services. The global division of labor has 
become more sophisticated, allowing for the 
provision of increasingly inexpensive consumer 
goods. China’s huge pool of inexpensive 
workers served as an important prerequisite 
for this development, while European firms 
seized the opportunity to optimize their cost 
structures and global supply chain. 
Chinese investment in the European 
Union has meanwhile contributed to creating 
or safeguarding jobs and to enhancing 
productivity growth. European firms acquired 
by Chinese incumbents gain support for 
expansion within the Chinese market, which 
remains a very difficult task especially 
for small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Moreover, Chinese companies tend to be 
interested in long-term investment and 
strategic commitment to a location rather than 
short-term financial investment; this ought to 
make them welcome in European countries. 
This said, China’s investment in the EU 
remains marginal, and its overall effect should 
not be overestimated.
For China, bilateral trade and investment 
with the European Union has been beneficial 
Top trading partners of China and the EU in 2011
EU’s top three trading partners China’s top three trading partners
1. US 445 bn. 1 1. EU 567 bn. $
2. China (without Hong Kong) 429 bn. 1 2. US 447 bn. $
3. Russia 308 bn. 1 3. ASEAN 363 bn. $
Source: Eurostat; China Customs (total amount of imports and exports).
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in several ways. Its national economic structure 
has undergone a remarkable transformation 
in the last three decades, during which time 
China’s population has seen an unprecedented 
rise in living standards. Foreign trade and 
investment have been significant contributors 
to this development. They have accelerated 
the pace of industrialization, especially in 
regard to consumer goods, and contributed 
to the development of the service sector. 
China’s export-oriented model has ensured 
a steady influx of previously scarce foreign 
currency. Today, China holds the world’s 
largest foreign reserves ($3.2 trillion as of 
December 2011). The continuous flow of IFDI 
has created millions of jobs for educated 
urban workers, as well as for the surplus 
rural laborers who have poured into the 
cities since the mid-1980s.
Cooperation with foreign partners has 
given Chinese firms the opportunity to acquire 
modern international management skills and 
learn to operate under market conditions. 
Western technology has moreover helped 
China narrow the “technological gap.” 
III. Europe and China, 
increase openness and 
transparency!
In general, China’s leadership has 
embraced the concept of free trade and 
investment, and has gradually liberalized 
China’s economy without losing sight of 
the country’s current stage of development. 
On March 18, just two months before the 
EP resolution cited above, China’s National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
published its “Suggestions on the 2012 
Working Focus for Deepening the Reform 
of the Economic Structure.” This document, 
which outlines important steps toward the 
implementation of the 12th Five Year Plan (2011 
– 2015), explicitly advocates the “promotion 
China’s FDI stock in the European Union (mn euro)
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of a balanced development in [foreign] trade 
(cujin maoyi pingheng fazhan).” This shows 
that China recognizes and is willing to tackle 
trade-related issues, but that this will take 
time. The EU should actively encourage China 
to broaden its open door policy, but should also 
accept a pace of adaptation that is both set by 
China itself and is suitable to the country’s 
specific situation.
In this context, the EP proposal to introduce 
tighter controls on foreign investment, with 
particular emphasis on investment from 
China, sends the wrong signal. The resolution 
states that “an EU monitoring body, similar to 
the review board in the U.S., would provide 
a coordinated, advance evaluation of foreign 
strategic investment.” The Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) 
is one of the most important regulatory bodies 
in regard to foreign investment in that country. 
Traditionally, CFIUS does not investigate 
FDI randomly, but rather scrutinizes cross-
border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
only in strategic industries, in which foreign 
ownership might threaten national security. 
Beginning in 2007, however, CFIUS has been 
required to pay closer attention to foreign 
governmental involvement in FDI. Several 
takeovers proposed by Chinese companies, 
including of private firms in the United States, 
have since that time failed due to CFIUS 
intervention. These experiences have led many 
in China to believe that Chinese investors are 
being treated unfairly, and that Chinese M&A 
transactions are among those most likely to 
receive the greatest scrutiny.
Due to their country of origin, Chinese 
firms are generally suspected of holding a 
secondary political agenda, even though 
several recent studies on Chinese OFDI, 
including one performed by the Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, have found that economic incentives 
are stronger than any political motivations. 
The European Union thus ought to think 
twice before resorting to measures similar to 
CFIUS, as these would only confirm China’s 
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impression that some EU trading partners 
are being treated differently than others. In 
addition, the EU – a global model of economic 
liberalization and integration – would in this 
case set a bad example, which instead of 
securing reciprocity in trade and investment 
would risk triggering a vicious circle of 
reciprocal protectionism. 
In turn, China must take EU concerns 
seriously, and do more than simply try to 
tough things out. It is time for China to take 
a step toward her strategic partner and show 
that the partnership is more than simply 
rhetorical, at least in regard to trade and 
investment. In some strategic industries, 
foreign firms are still obliged to establish a 
joint venture with a Chinese partner in order 
to participate in the Chinese market. Frequent 
intellectual property violations constitute an 
additional risk for foreign investors in China. 
As both have been pressing issues for years, 
China should move far more decisively toward 
abolishing forced joint ventures and protecting 
intellectual property rights.
Public procurement is another of the EU’s 
major concerns. At the core of the EU criticism 
lies the unequal treatment afforded to European 
and domestic firms within China’s public 
procurement system, which is marked by a 
lack of transparency and competition. Though 
China entered negotiations for accession to 
the WTO Government Procurement Act (GPA) 
in 2007, progress thus far has been slow and 
unsatisfactory from the perspective of the GPA 
parties.
Instead of passively waiting for China 
to become a part of the GPA regime, an 
eventuality that holds uncertain actual 
promise, the EU could take a proactive step 
and seek to deepen cooperation in the realm of 
public procurement. For instance, a common 
platform could be created, perhaps in the form 
of an online gateway translated into Chinese 
and the major EU languages, which brings 
together potential contract providers and 
suppliers from both regions. Transparency 
and competition could thus be enhanced in the 
long run. Discrimination against foreign firms 
might be tackled through the establishment 
of a common committee for the evaluation of 
suppliers’ bids. The platform could initially be 
launched as a small pilot project, restricted 
to specific industries or projects, and – if 
successful – be gradually extended in the 
future. China’s successful recipe for reform – 
“crossing the river while feeling the stepping 
stones” (mozhe shitou guohe) – could help to 
get this process started.
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